

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF UKRAINE

SUMY STATE UNIVERSITY

Educational and Research Institute of Business, Economics and Management

Department of International Economic Relations

“Admitted to the defense”

Head of the Department

_____ Fedir Zhuravka

(signature) (full name)

« ___ » _____ 20__

QUALIFICATION PAPER

It is submitted for the Master`s degree

Specialty 292 “International Economic Relations”

on the topic “GEOPOLITICAL AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC PRIORITIES FOR
UKRAINE'S DEVELOPMENT

Student group IB.m-31

_____ Eldar Dzhobava

(signature)

It is submitted for the Master's level degree requirements fulfillment.

Master's level degree qualification paper contains the results of own research. The use of the ideas, results and texts of other authors has a link to the corresponding source

_____ Eldar Dzhobava

(signature)

Research advisor Dr of Economics, Professor, _____

(position, scientific degree)

(signature)

Fedir Zhuravka

(full name)

Sumy, 2024

SUMMARY

of Master's level degree qualification paper on the theme
“GEOPOLITICAL AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC PRIORITIES FOR
UKRAINE'S DEVELOPMENT”

student Eldar Dzhobava

The main content of the master's level degree qualification paper is set out on 50 pages, including a list of used sources of 70 titles, which is placed on 4 pages. The work contains 12 tables, 6 figures, as well as 10 applications, which are placed on 16 pages.

KEYWORDS: GEOPOLITICS, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, GEOPOLITICAL POSITION OF UKRAINE, FOREIGN PRIOTITIES OF UKRAINE, INTERNATIONAL, FOREIGN ECONOMIC PRIORITIES OF UKRAINE.

The purpose of the master's level degree qualification paper is is to establish the theoretical and practical foundations for the formation and strengthening of Ukraine's geopolitical position in the context of its current geopolitical vector.

The is the factors and processes that influence the formation of the geopolitical vector of Ukraine's development.

The object of the study is the factors and processes that influence the formation of the geopolitical vector of Ukraine's development.

The subject of the study is the geopolitical direction of Ukraine in the context of the current geopolitical situation in the region.

To achieve this goal and objectives there were used following scientific methods of research: analysis and synthesis, grouping and generalization, induction, deduction, scientific abstraction and logical generalization, tabular and graphical methods

The information base of the master's level degree qualification paper is scientific works of domestic and foreign authors, popular science sources, statistical databases (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, International Monetary Fund), reports of international organizations.

The main scientific results of the work are as follows:

1) author's basic strategy of Ukraine development;

advantage";

2) systematization of factors that determine geopolitic position of Ukraine;

The obtained results can be used by the Ukrainian government in the formulation of strategic plans of developing Ukrainian geopolitical vector in the future.

The results of the approbation of the main provisions of the master's level degree qualification paper were considered at:

Year of Master's level qualification paper fulfillment is 2024

Year of Master's level paper defense is 2024

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF UKRAINE

SUMY STATE UNIVERSITY

Educational and Research Institute of Business, Economics and Management

Department of International Economic Relations

TASKS FOR MASTER'S LEVEL DEGREE QUALIFICATION PAPER

(specialty 292 " International Economic Relations ")

student 2 course, group IB.m-31

Eldar Dzhobava

1. The theme of the paper is «GEOPOLITICAL AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC PRIORITIES FOR UKRAINE'S DEVELOPMENT» approved by the order of the university from from 03.12 2024 № 1255-VI.
2. The term of completed paper submission by the student is 10.12.2024
3. The purpose of the qualification paper is to to establish the theoretical and practical foundations for the formation and strengthening of Ukraine's geopolitical position in the context of its current geopolitical vector.
4. The object of the study is the factors and processes that influence the formation of the geopolitical vector of Ukraine's development
5. The subject of the study is the geopolitical direction of Ukraine in the context of the current geopolitical situation in the region.
6. The information base of the master's level degree qualification paper is scientific works of domestic and foreign authors, popular science sources, statistical databases (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, International Monetary Fund), reports of international organizations.
7. Approximate master's level degree qualification paper plan, terms for submitting chapters to the research advisor and the content of tasks for the accomplished purpose is as follows:

Chapter 1 «THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF GEOPOLITICAL AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT»

Chapter 1 deals with the theoretical foundations of geopolitics, reasons of formation of geopolitics and foreign policy of Ukraine. In this chapter was defined and classified geopolitical reasons of formation of Ukraine foreign policy, analyzed historical and geographical reasons of current geopolitical vector of Ukraine.

Chapter 2 «ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF GEOPOLITICAL AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE»

Chapter 2 deals with current state if geopolitical development of Ukraine. In this chapter was analyzed historical and current geopolitical problems of Ukraine, and was developed scenarios and strategy of development of Ukrainian state.

8. Supervision on work:

Chapter	Full name and position of the advisor	Date, signature	
		task issued by	Task accepted by
1	Fedir Zhuravka, Dr of Economics, Professor	01.11.2024	10.11.2024
2	Fedir Zhuravka, Dr of Economics, Professor	11.11.2024	27.11.2024

9. Date of issue of the task: 20.10.2024.

Research Advisor:

(signature) (full name)

The tasks have been received:

(signature) (full name)

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	7
1 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF GEOPOLITICAL AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.....	9
1.1 Internal reasons for the formation of geopolitics and foreign policy of Ukraine..	9
1.2 External reasons for the formation of geopolitics and foreign policy of Ukraine.	20
2 ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF GEOPOLITICAL AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE.....	29
2.1 Ukraine's geopolitical position: eastern problem.....	29
2.2 Geopolitical vector of Ukraine: possible scenarios and development strategy of the country.	38
CONCLUSIONS.....	47
REFERENCES.....	49

INTRODUCTION

Ukraine is at the epicenter of complex geopolitical processes that shape the modern international order. Its strategic location at the intersection of East and West determines not only the role of the state in regional and global politics, but also creates numerous challenges. On the one hand, Ukraine seeks integration into the European Union and NATO, which involves deep structural reforms, ensuring the rule of law and strengthening democratic institutions. On the other hand, the country faces a constant threat of military aggression from the Russian Federation, which seeks to maintain its influence in the region.

In addition to security challenges, considerable attention is paid to issues of foreign economic policy, which is a key instrument for Ukraine's integration into the global economic space. Effective use of the potential of the agricultural sector, high technologies, industry and transport infrastructure can be a guarantee of economic stability and increasing the country's competitiveness in world markets.

The relevance of the study is determined by the need to analyze the geopolitical and foreign economic priorities of Ukraine in the face of modern challenges. Understanding the impact of international processes on national interests, assessing the current state of relations with key partners, and developing recommendations to strengthen Ukraine's positions in the international arena are important tasks for ensuring the sustainable development of the state. The theoretical and empirical foundations of the geopolitics of Ukraine have been revealed in numerous studies by foreign and domestic scientists, among which it is worth highlighting. R. Kjellén, H.J. Mackinder, Y. Lypa, M. Dniestrianskyi etc. A separate part of the scientific output is devoted to the issues of the direction of Ukraine's development from a geopolitical point of view. Despite this, there is a limited number of works that comprehensively investigated the importance of geopolitics for Ukraine in ensuring its national security and well-being.

The object of the study is the factors and processes that influence the formation of the geopolitical vector of Ukraine's development.

The subject of the study is the geopolitical direction of Ukraine in the context of the current geopolitical situation in the region.

The purpose of the qualification work is to establish the theoretical and practical foundations for the formation and strengthening of Ukraine's geopolitical position in the context of its current geopolitical vector.

To achieve the goal, the following tasks are set in the work:

- to investigate the essence and foundations of Ukraine's geopolitics at all levels;
- to identify the main geopolitical threats to Ukraine;
- to analyze the vector of Ukraine's development as a geopolitical actor;
- to assess the prospects and current geopolitical situation of Ukraine in the international system and form possible scenarios;
- to form a vision of the prospects for the probable development of Ukraine for further research.

In the research process, depending on the goals and objectives, appropriate general scientific and empirical research methods were used, including: analysis and synthesis, grouping and generalization (when studying the theoretical foundations of geopolitics and identifying the main threats to Ukraine), induction, deduction, scientific abstraction and logical generalization (when assessing the current geopolitical situation of Ukraine), tabular and graphical methods (when analyzing Ukraine's main trading partners and its political and geographical situation in the geopolitical context).

The information base of the work is scientific works of domestic and foreign authors, popular science sources, statistical databases (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, International Monetary Fund), reports of international organizations, etc.

The practical significance of the results obtained lies in the analysis of the current geopolitical situation in Ukraine and the development of a strategy for the development of Ukraine.

The work consists of an introduction, 38 pages of the main text, conclusions, and a list of sources used.

1 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES

GEOPOLITICAL AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

1.1 Internal reasons for the formation of geopolitics and foreign policy of Ukraine.

The modern world order is undergoing significant changes under the influence of global and regional processes, such as the aggravation of interstate conflicts, the transformation of international organizations, the change in the role of great powers and the intensification of competition for geopolitical influence. In such conditions, Ukraine, which is located at the intersection of the interests of leading geopolitical players, faces multifaceted challenges that determine its future place in the international system.

Ukraine's geopolitical priorities are aimed at ensuring the sovereignty, territorial integrity and sustainable development of the state. Given the strategic position of Ukraine, important aspects for the country are integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, the establishment of effective relations with neighboring countries, as well as countering threats from states pursuing an aggressive policy, such as the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Turkey [12][52].

The key areas of Ukraine's geopolitical strategy remain further deepening cooperation with the European Union, implementing the Association Agreement, achieving NATO membership criteria, and forming new alliances with democratic states. Of particular importance is strengthening cooperation within the framework of regional initiatives, such as the Lublin Triangle and the Three Seas Initiative [15][17].

However, Ukraine also faces numerous challenges, including energy dependence, the need to modernize the economy under significant geopolitical pressure, addressing the issue of domestic political stability, and countering

disinformation campaigns. Analysis of these challenges allows for a deeper understanding of state policy priorities and the identification of effective strategies for their implementation. For the convenience of conducting an in-depth analysis, there is a need to divide the reasons for the formation of Ukraine's geopolitical vectors into certain categories, such as:

- 1) Scale. Any processes related to the geopolitical priorities of any country should be considered at different scales: from global, to regional and local. In the era of globalization, the economies of individual countries are interconnected into a multi-layered, super-complex knot. Because of this, the policy of one country, regardless of the intentionality of the implementation of this policy, can influence the policy of a completely different country in another part of the planet.
- 2) By geopolitical risks. Certain processes arise under the influence of geopolitical risks, such as the risk of external conquest of a state by another state, the risk of the collapse of a state under the influence of internal or external forces, the risk of a decrease in sovereignty (the ability of a state to defend its interests in the international arena). Accordingly, the reasons for the formation of a country's geopolitics can be seen as both internal challenges (domestic policy) and external (foreign policy).
- 3) Political geography. The politics of any country depends heavily on geography: the location of the country, access to the world's oceans, the availability of minerals, resources, population distribution, etc. Accordingly, this category is very important for analysis.

To begin with, it is necessary to consider the category of political geography. The political geography of Ukraine plays an important role in shaping its geopolitical course. The country's location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, on the border between the European Union and Russia, as well as its access to the Black Sea determine the strategic nature of Ukraine in the regional and global context.

Ukraine has significant geographical potential for the development of transport and logistics corridors. Important international trade routes pass through

its territory, in particular the East-West corridor, connecting Western Europe with Central Asia and China (the Trans-Caspian transport route), and the North-South corridor, which helps connect the Baltic and Black Seas. [1].



Figure 1.1. – China plan for creation Central asia trade route [42]

These trade routes already existed in the 11th century. The trade route «From the Varangians to the Greeks» (which connected the Baltic and Black Seas) played a significant role in strengthening Kyiv, and one of the branches of the Great Silk Road passed through the territory of southern Ukraine and was controlled by the Polovtsians (the East-West corridor). So despite the antiquity of these trade routes, the geographical factor in the formation of Ukrainian foreign trade is very important [7][14].

In addition, the country is an important element of Europe's energy security due to the presence of a transit gas transportation system. Ukrainian gas pipelines traditionally ensure the supply of Russian gas to European countries, which gives it significant leverage in relations with the EU and Russia [16].

However, the country's geography itself creates challenges. The lack of natural barriers in the east of the country makes it vulnerable to external aggression from Russia, which was especially evident during the military operations in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea, and later gave rise to a full-scale invasion by the

Russian Federation. Proximity to conflict zones and tensions in the region forces Ukraine to actively seek alliances with international partners to ensure security and maintain stability. Ukraine is washed by the Black Sea to the south, which provides great economic potential for the country, but creates tension between Ukraine and the Republic of Türkiye, whose geopolitical intentions are to dominate the Black Sea region [62].

Another problem in the geography of Ukraine is the natural barriers within the country, such as the Dnieper and the Carpathians. The Dnieper is the main river of Ukraine, and divides Ukraine into left-bank and right-bank. Such a large river is geopolitically a very good natural barrier, and is quite suitable for drawing political borders, which was the key to the separation of the Russian and Polish spheres of interest in 1667. It was the division of Ukraine into left-bank and right-bank that led to the more difficult unification of Ukraine compared to other European states [19].



Figure 1.2. - Natural barriers in and around Ukraine

On the other hand, the Carpathians are a good natural barrier that separates Ukraine from the Balkan Peninsula. However, at the same time, the Carpathians

separate the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine from «continental» Ukraine, which is a big problem in connection with Hungarian revanchism [28].

Ukraine can be broadly categorized into twelve socio-geographic macro-regions: the Transcarpathian region (consisting solely of Transcarpathia), the Galicia region (comprising Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil regions), the Volyn region (including Rivne and Volyn regions), the Bukovina-Northern Bessarabia region (covering Chernivtsi region), the Podolsk-Polisky region (encompassing Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, and Vinnytsia regions), the Central Right-Bank region (comprising Kyiv, Cherkasy, and Kirovohrad regions), the Central Left-Bank region (including Chernihiv, Poltava, and Sumy regions), the Dnipro-Kharkiv region (encompassing Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv regions), the Donetsk region (covering Donetsk and Luhansk regions), the Odessa region (Odessa region), the Central Black Sea region (comprising Mykolaiv and Kherson regions), and the Crimean region (Autonomous Republic of Crimea).

These macro-regions are shaped by historical and political developments and are defined by ethno-geographic factors such as the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians and minorities, ethnic diversity, population composition by native language, and the degree of assimilation. Socio-economic factors, including urbanization levels and the balance of economic sectors, also play a role in their division. Each macro-region has its own geopolitical direction, and shifts in the political and economic landscape within these regions can significantly influence both Ukraine's domestic affairs and foreign policy.. [6].



Figure 1.3. – Socio-geographical Macrodistricts of Ukraine [6].

From a geographical point of view, the most stable macro-regions of Ukraine are the westernmost regions: Transcarpathian, Galician, Volyn, and Bukovina-Northern Bessarabian macro-regions. It is in these macro-districts that the percentage of purely Ukrainian ethnic population is the most significant (these macro-districts are generally mono-ethnic in nature, distinguished by a high share of ethnic Ukrainians (over 95%), a small share of ethnic Russians (less than 5%) and Russian-speaking population (less than 4%), and the ethnic diversity of the Transcarpathian and Bukovina-Northern Bessarabian macro-districts is insignificant for the emergence of a conflict. However, politically these macro-districts have less influence than others, which is associated with the lower economic potential of these macro-districts (with the exception of the Galician macro-district, which has a fairly large influence on neighboring macro-districts and is a regional center). The territory of the three macro-districts of central Ukraine (Podilskyi-Polisky, Central-Right-Bank and Central-Left-Bank), like the western regions, covers the primary area of Ukrainian settlement and nation-building, which significantly determines its predominantly monoethnic character. The share of Ukrainians in these areas varies from over 85% (mainly in Sumy region) to about 95% (Vinnytsia region). Ethno-national minorities, such as Jews and Russians, in the Podolsk-Polisky, Central

Right-Bank and Central Left-Bank regions are mostly dispersed, i.e. concentrated in large administrative and industrial centers. The only exception is the Putyvl district of Sumy region, where ethnic Russians have a slight numerical advantage (51.6% Russians and 47.4% Ukrainians). The share of Ukrainians who speak Russian as their native language is somewhat higher than in the Volyn and Galician macro-regions, ranging from 1% to 4% in the right-bank part and up to 7.6% in the left-bank. However, in general, in each of these three macro-districts, the share of the Ukrainian-speaking population is only slightly inferior to the share of Ukrainians who speak Russian. At the same time, which is an important indicator for ethnic and political identification, assessing the integrity of the Ukrainian cultural environment, in all regions of the Podolsk-Polisky, Central Right-Bank and Central Left-Bank districts, the share of Ukrainians with native Russian is smaller than the share of Russians who speak Ukrainian. The only exceptions are the city of Kyiv and some industrial cities, in particular Kremenchuk and Shostka. Among the characteristic features of these districts, one can note a high level of Ukrainian self-awareness, as well as a significant degree of complementarity to the largest ethno-national group - Russians. Due to this, the contradictions of ethno-political development are not very pronounced, and therefore these three regions of the central part of Ukraine have sufficient grounds to become the core of the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation on the basis of national statehood and conflict-free development of ethno-political processes, taking into account their geographical location, economic potential and historical significance [2][4].

The Dnipro-Kharkiv socio-geographic macro-district is located entirely within the territory of the Ukrainian ethnic range, but the process of its mass settlement in the modern period occurred somewhat later than in the neighboring Central-Left-Bank region. The economic development of the territory had a significant impact on the formation of the identity of this district and the political self-awareness of its population. The high level of industrialization and the availability of significant land resources became powerful factors for the immigration of non-Ukrainian groups, in particular to large cities and administrative

and industrial centers. Today, the share of Ukrainians among the total population of the district is approximately 70% to 80%, and among the rural population - from 77% in Zaporizhia region to 90.4% in Dnipropetrovsk region. At the same time, this macro-district is home to 22% of all ethnic Russians in Ukraine, whose share varies from 17.6% in Dnipropetrovsk region to 25.6% in Kharkiv region. Among Ukrainians who considered Ukrainian their native language before the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation, this figure exceeds 70%. However, there is a noticeable linguistic differentiation between the rural and urban population, in particular, in the Kharkiv region before the full-scale invasion, only 66.7% of urban Ukrainians considered Ukrainian their native language, and in the city of Kharkiv itself - only 50.4% [4].

The political and geographical issues of the Kharkiv-Dnipro socio-geographical macro-region are determined not only by its ethno-geographic structure and geopolitical position, but also by its significant economic potential, in particular in the industrial sphere, which gives great political influence to this macro-region, on whose territory strategically important science-intensive industries are concentrated, as well as the formation of powerful financial and industrial groups that actively use ethno-political ideas in the struggle for influence at the national level. Since the share of ethnic Ukrainians among the business and industrial elite and citizens who support the Ukrainian cultural and political tradition is relatively small (relative to the western and central macro-regions), the geo-cultural and geopolitical ideas of «Russian great power» are often strong in the region. In this context, competition between business groups for influence at the national level leads to ethno-political contradictions. In addition, the high level of assimilation and acculturation of ethnic Ukrainians in regional centers, in particular in Kharkiv and Zaporizhia, contributes to the greater spread of regional identities than national identities. [4].

The Donetsk macro-region, which is mostly located within the Ukrainian ethnic territory, had a significant bi-ethnic Ukrainian-Russian character at the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war (2014), which is due to the later mass

settlement and the influence of migration processes during economic development. This region was home to 34% of all Russians in Ukraine, of whom over 11% were those born in Russia. The share of ethnic Ukrainians among the population in general exceeded 57%, and among the rural population — about 73%. At the same time, the share of Russians among the total population was over 38%, and among rural residents — over 20%. According to the 2001 census, the population of this macro-region with a native Ukrainian language was a minority - only about 27%. One of the characteristic features of this macro-region is a deep crisis of Ukrainian identity, especially in the central and southern parts, as well as the processes of Russification of representatives of small ethnic groups. On the other hand, a high level of interethnic marriages, along with other factors, has partially reduced the expressiveness of ethno-national self-consciousness and contributed to a greater spread of regional identity [4].

The higher level of industrial development of the Donetsk region contributed to the emergence of powerful financial and industrial groups that showed ambitions to establish their dominant position in the political system of Ukraine. These groups tried to impose on Ukrainian society the model of socio-cultural relations formed in the region, which led to the aggravation of interregional political confrontation. This was especially evident during the 2004 presidential campaign, when, due to provocations by Russian political strategists, unrest broke out in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine over dual citizenship, mainly Russian and Ukrainian, as well as granting the Russian language the status of the state language. It was these factors that became a good foundation for Russian influence on Ukraine [4].

Odesa region, as a separate socio-geographic macro-region, is distinguished by a number of characteristic features, among which the most significant is the high ethnic mosaic of the southern «Bessarabian» part. The ethno-national structure of this territory was formed as a result of both objective processes of settlement and the policy of the Russian government during the 18th-19th centuries. The factor of settlement and cultural presence of ethno-national minorities is of great importance for the Odessa agglomeration and the northern part of the region. Despite the

absolute majority of the Ukrainian population according to the 2001 census (62.8%), among the linguistic structure of the region, only a relative majority (less than 50%) indicated Ukrainian as their native language, while the share of the population with Russian as their native language is quite significant. The greatest contradictions in ethno-political development are observed in the regional center - the city of Odesa. In particular, the historical image of Odessa artificially created by modern media and the widespread mythology, as part of the official ideology of the local elite, have little connection with the Ukrainian cultural and political tradition. It should also be noted the tendency to focus on cosmopolitan forces that have various connections with local authorities and former representatives of the nomenklatura.

In two regions of the southern Central-Black Sea socio-geographical macro-region - Mykolaiv and Kherson, which have long been under the influence of Ukrainian cultural and political traditions, and in the late 18th - early 19th centuries became an integral part of the Ukrainian ethnic territory, the specific share of Ukrainians according to the 2001 census was approximately 82%. The share of Russians in these regions was also the same - 14.1%. Although the contradictions associated with the insufficient level of Ukrainian national identification also occur here, the destructive politicization of the population based on the mobilization of regional or Soviet identities is less justified than in the neighboring Odessa region.

The most complex territorial-political situation is observed in the Crimean macro-region, which, taking into account the complex processes of settlement and the intervention of the state factor in the ethnodemographic situation, is of an ethnically mixed nature. Compared to other regions, Crimea is distinguished by the overwhelming majority of ethnically russians and russian-speaking population. A negative prerequisite for ethno-political processes is also the high level of assimilation and acculturation of ethnic Ukrainians, which hinders their ability to perform cultural-integration and state-consolidating functions. The level of linguistic Russification among Ukrainians in the largest cities was especially high: in Simferopol - 70.8%, in Sevastopol - 70.1%. Only in the northern districts (Krasnoperekopsk, Pervomaysk, Rozdolnensk) did the share of Ukrainians with

their native Ukrainian language exceed 50% according to the 2001 census. On the other hand, Crimea is the key to economic and military dominance in the Black Sea region [4] [6].

As a result of the analysis of the territorial and political situation in various macro-regions of Ukraine, several important conclusions can be drawn. The most stable in terms of ethno-national structure are the western regions, where the mono-ethnic Ukrainian population prevails, which contributes to relative political and social stability. The central macro-regions also demonstrate a high level of ethnic homogeneity, although their linguistic situation is somewhat more complicated due to the presence of Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking populations. At the same time, growing contradictions and politicization in regions such as the Dnipro-Kharkiv macro-region can lead to the emergence of ethno-political tensions, especially due to economic factors and linguistic assimilation.

The most difficult situation is in the southern regions, in particular in Crimea, where ethnic mixture and a high proportion of the Russian-speaking population create conditions for tension. This also applies to the Odessa region, where ethnic mosaicism and the influence of Russian culture create difficulties in the process of integration into a single national cultural space (Figure 1.4).




Figure 1.4. The majority language by city, town and village councils [4]

Thus, the territorial, ethnic and linguistic structure of Ukraine's macro-regions are important factors determining the dynamics of ethno-political processes in the country. Taking these factors into account allows us to better understand the potential for national consolidation and political development in different regions, which is key to preserving the territorial integrity and stability of the state. The unique geographical position shapes Ukraine's policy as a «buffer zone» or «link between Europe and Asia», but at the same time opens up opportunities for integration into various global economic and political structures. This makes its geographical factor key in the strategic planning of foreign policy.

1.2 External reasons for the formation of geopolitics and foreign policy of Ukraine.

Ukraine's geopolitical and foreign policy is largely shaped by external factors that determine its position in the international arena. Globalization, changing balance of power in the world, regional challenges, and the activities of international organizations create external prerequisites for the development of state strategies [12].

One of the key factors is Ukraine's neighborhood with major geopolitical players - the European Union and the Russian Federation. Political competition between these forces directly affects Ukraine's strategic priorities, which vary between a European integration course and countering Russian pressure.

An important role is also played by the regional policy of other neighboring states, in particular Belarus, Poland, Romania, and Turkey, where the latter seek to strengthen their influence in the Black Sea region. This creates both opportunities for partnership and new risks associated with competition for resources and strategic positions.

At the global level, Ukraine faces such challenges as political instability in the international system, the escalation of the conflict with Russia, and Ukraine's involvement in conflicts in neighboring regions, which is accompanied by the transformation of traditional alliances. In response, Ukraine is forced to develop a multi-vector approach aimed at strengthening its positions in key international organizations, such as the UN, NATO, and the WTO.

External factors also determine the economic aspect of Ukraine's geopolitics. Integration into global markets and active participation in international trade are becoming foreign policy priorities, especially in the context of competition for investment and access to new technologies.

Thus, external reasons shape not only the basic approaches to developing Ukraine's geopolitics, but also set the main directions of foreign policy aimed at ensuring national interests in a complex and dynamic international environment.

Starting from the local level in the first point of this work, to further understand the context of regional processes, it is necessary to move immediately to global processes, namely:

- 1) 1) The formation of the so-called «alliance of tyrants», which includes the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation and its satellites (the Republic of Belarus and Russian-funded private military corporations), the Islamic Republic of Iran (and Iranian-funded terrorist organizations), and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This alliance, guided by neo-imperialist ideas, aims to destroy the current geopolitical dominance of the so-called «Western world» in the face of the United States of America and the North Atlantic Alliance [44].
- 2) The People's Republic of China's struggle for dominance in the Pacific and African regions [29][40].
- 3) A relatively sharp change in the geopolitical situation in the South American region [51].
- 4) The beginning of the struggle for dominance over the polar regions between the USA, the Russian Federation and the PRC [27].

- 5) Strengthening the role of the Republic of India in South Asia [64].
- 6) Iran's hybrid war with Israel [23].

These geopolitical processes are a consequence of the unresolved geopolitical problems of the 20th century, the consequence of which is a possible third world war [69] [70].

By analyzing local and global processes, the vectors of regional processes become clearer, as they are intertwined with numerous external and internal factors. The war in Ukraine, which began in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the beginning of the open phase of the conflict in the Donbas, is not only an internal conflict, but also part of a broader geopolitical game that covers the entire European continent and has far-reaching global consequences. The war in Ukraine has deep geopolitical causes that go far beyond domestic political factors and are caused by complex contradictions between major international actors [56] [69].

The roots of this confrontation stretch back to the long-standing struggle for geopolitical influence in Eastern Europe, where Ukraine plays a key role, given its strategic location between despotic Russia and European democracies. The confrontation between Russia and the West – the European Union and NATO – is deepening due to Ukraine's desire to integrate with European structures and its efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and economic stability. These processes intersect with historical, cultural and economic factors that determine Ukraine's domestic policy and its foreign policy course [30] [50].

Thus, the war in Ukraine is becoming not only a struggle for territorial integrity, but also part of a global struggle for order and influence in Europe and the world. It reflects the broader context of changes in world politics, where key actors are trying to realize their strategic interests, which inevitably affects security and stability in the region. Ukraine is a key state at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, which makes it a strategic object for major geopolitical players. It acts as a buffer zone between the European Union and NATO from the west and Russia from the east. The loss of Ukraine as an ally or its transformation into an adversary creates

significant threats for either side. For Russia, Ukraine is crucial as part of its «historical sphere of influence» and the only resource base to support Russia's geopolitical ideas of «Eurasianism». Only control over Ukraine, even indirect, allows Moscow to maintain its status as a regional superpower, control the Black Sea, and influence the policies of neighboring countries [49] [57].

The annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in the Donbas were driven by Russia's desire to regain control over a territory it considers part of its historical heritage and sphere of influence, contrary to international law and historical facts. For Russia, these territories are not only strategically important, but also deeply symbolic, as they are associated with its imperial past, cultural ties, and geopolitical interests. Crimea, in particular, is of particular importance as it is an important naval hub, and is also historically significant for Russia due to its role in the development of the empire and its culture. In addition, the restoration of control over Crimea symbolizes for the Kremlin the restoration of Russian greatness and rivalry with the West, which is an important component of Russia's foreign policy [25] [58].

The military actions were not a direct response to Ukraine's European integration course, in particular the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU in 2014, but were planned earlier, as part of a larger Russian strategy. These actions were part of a long-term plan to maintain or restore political and economic influence in Ukraine, which, from Moscow's point of view, is an important strategic border between Russia and Europe. After Ukraine's political course changed in favor of European integration, Russia saw a serious threat to its interests. For the Kremlin, the loss of Ukraine as part of its «sphere of influence» was unacceptable, since it would mean weakening its geopolitical positions in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, the annexation of Crimea, the formation and support of the separatist movement in Donbas were a reaction to the geopolitical uncertainty of post-revolutionary Ukraine, which was a very good opportunity to start aggressive actions. These actions became a stage in the Kremlin's broader strategy to maintain its influence in

the post-Soviet space and prevent further loss of territories important for Russian geopolitics [5].

In addition, Russia seeks to stop Ukraine from joining NATO, which the Kremlin sees as a serious threat to its national security and geopolitical interests. For Russia, the «Eastern enlargement of NATO» and the possible entry of Ukraine into this alliance is unacceptable, as it

- 1) would significantly reduce its strategic space and strengthen the military presence of the West directly near its borders, which would reduce the chances of successful Russian aggression against European countries.
- 2) Russia views NATO as a potential military threat, because in the event of Ukraine joining the Alliance, most of Russia's industry would be within the scope of direct military influence (due to Ukraine's location in the East European Plain). Accordingly, Russia's greatest ambitions are to capture the entire East European Plain in order to guarantee the security of Russia's economic core and establish a stable western border [22][65].

Therefore, Moscow's strategic calculation is to keep Ukraine outside NATO by any means necessary, as this would mean losing the last important buffer between its territory and Western democracies for Russia.

The aggression against Ukraine has become a signal to other countries in the region that Moscow is ready to use force to protect its interests and secure its own sphere of influence, even if this contradicts international norms and principles of sovereignty. Russia is thus trying to demonstrate its readiness to escalate the conflict in order to force the countries of the post-Soviet space to refrain from integrating into Western alliances, in particular NATO and the EU. This military offensive against Ukraine has become not only an attempt to regain control over strategic territories, but also part of a broader policy to maintain Russian influence in Eastern Europe.

However, the fact of Ukraine's European integration was not the cause of the invasion, but only a pretext for it. In fact, these military actions were part of a long-term strategy of Russia, which even before the beginning of the process of Ukraine's

European integration saw it as a potential threat to its sphere of influence. For the Kremlin, Ukraine's aspiration for European integration was only a catalyst that accelerated the implementation of already planned actions. Russia, considering this country as an important element of its geopolitical space, decided to act preventively in order to stop this process and prevent the strengthening of the vector of Ukrainian foreign policy in favor of the West. Therefore, aggression against Ukraine is part of a deeper strategy of the Kremlin aimed at ensuring its dominance in the post-Soviet space and avoiding any loss of strategic positions.

Ukraine has also played a key role in the transit of Russian gas to Europe. Russia has repeatedly used gas as a tool for political pressure, including through price manipulation or supply disruptions. Control over the Ukrainian gas transportation system and its bypassing through projects such as Nord Stream 2 are of strategic importance to Moscow (Figure 1.5) [48].



Figure 1.5 – Gas transit pipelines in Ukraine [33]

Control over Crimea ensures dominance in the Black Sea. The annexation of Crimea gives Moscow the opportunity to project its power in the region, including influencing trade routes and NATO military positions. The loss of Crimea for Ukraine was not only a military and political blow, but also limited its ability to

develop its own military fleet and control regional resources, and completely cut off the possibility of using ports in the Sea of Azov [8].

Considering that Ukraine's European integration means not only Moscow's loss of its geopolitical influence, but also the creation of new challenges for the authoritarian model of government in Russia, since a successful democratic Ukraine can serve as an example for other post-Soviet countries. Deepening cooperation and a possible union of the Baltic-Black Sea axis countries are a guarantee of the destruction of both the geopolitical ambitions of the Russian Federation and the state as a whole (Figure 1.6) [1].




Figure 1.6 – Map of the potential Baltic Black Sea axis [1]

The regional destabilization caused by the war affects all neighboring countries. Political and economic instability, migration flows, the threat of military escalation are causing concern in Poland, Romania, Turkey and the Baltic states. NATO and the EU are forced to respond to the aggression by strengthening their eastern borders, which contributes to the escalation of tensions between the Alliance and Russia, but neither side can openly declare its intentions for fear of a global

conflict. On the other hand, one of the competitors of the Russian Federation is Turkey, which also has great influence in the Black Sea region. Turkey's geopolitical ambitions are pan-Turkism, which means influence over all Turkic peoples, which is a direct threat to Russia and the PRC, due to their geopolitical ambitions in the Central Asian region. Turkey's policy of pan-Turkism is also harmful for Ukraine, because the indigenous people of Crimea are the Crimeans, who are a Turkic people, and Crimea itself is an important geopolitical interest of Turkey, which gives reason to intervene in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict over the Crimean peninsula. Another geopolitical challenge is the policy of the Republic of Poland towards Ukraine. Poland views Ukraine as a buffer region from the Russian Federation, while balancing between its interest in Ukraine's accession to NATO for greater security guarantees for Poland, and its reluctance to provide Ukraine with the opportunity to join the European Union due to fears of a sharp economic rise in Ukraine due to open markets and a decrease in Poland's role in EU policy. Such an ambivalent policy has its geopolitical reasons, but for both Ukraine and Poland it is a window of opportunity for deepening cooperation through the «Three Seas Initiative» and the Lublin Triangle format. On the one hand, such cooperation could give a boost to the Ukrainian economy for exports through Polish ports in the Baltic Sea, and enable the export of Polish goods through Black Sea ports, but on the other hand, Poland claims leadership in this union, which is politically impossible due to cultural differences [43][67].

The most important link in ensuring Ukraine's geopolitical security is the Republic of Belarus, which geographically acts as a «shield» for Ukraine from Russian aggression. It is control over Belarus that allows the Russian Federation to wage a full-scale war with Ukraine, threatening Kyiv with an invasion from the north. Given its close cultural and historical ties with Belarus, it would be beneficial for Ukraine to have a pro-Ukrainian government in Belarus both from a security and economic perspective, having alternative access to the ports of the Baltic states.

The modern international system is characterized by competition between multipolar centers of power, such as the USA, the EU, China and Russia. Ukraine is

forced to adapt its foreign policy to these dynamics, and globalization contributes to Ukraine's economic rapprochement with developed countries, which requires it to adapt to international standards and rules. Free trade agreements with the EU and other countries open up new markets for Ukrainian goods, but also create challenges in terms of competition and structural reforms. For Ukraine, this can be an opportunity for economic growth and greater influence in the region, but the war with Russia has forced Ukraine to reorient its foreign policy towards strengthening its defense capabilities and integration into the NATO collective security system. Given the occupation of Ukrainian territory and the major economic downturn, Ukraine needs to have a clear post-war recovery plan and clearly define its priorities in the post-war reconstruction of the country, taking into account possible threats and opportunities for Ukraine.

2 ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF GEOPOLITICAL AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE

2.1 Ukraine's geopolitical position: eastern problem.

Considering the geopolitical situation of Ukraine and the challenges facing the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian people, one can recall the words of Sir Halford John Mackinder: «Who controls Eastern Europe, controls the Heartland. Who controls the Heartland, controls the World Island. Who controls the World Island, controls the World.» These words of the prominent geopolitician and founder of the London School of Economics are relevant in the current times [53].

The main challenges of Ukraine's geopolitical position are the country's geographical position itself. The two segments of Ukraine's state border that are geopolitically stable (a border that uses geographical obstacles) are the segment of the Ukrainian-Romanian border in the Odessa region, which runs along the Danube River, and the part of the Ukrainian-Romanian border in the Chernivtsi and Ivano-Frankivsk regions, which runs through the Carpathians, the Prut River, and the Bilka-Myk River.

The Ukrainian-Polish border is relatively stable, but it was shaped not by geographical obstacles but by diplomats. A much bigger problem is the Ukrainian-Belarusian border and the Ukrainian-Russian border [10].

A particularly acute issue was the use of the territory of Belarus as a springboard for Russian troops during a full-scale invasion in February 2022. Attacks, missile strikes, and movements of Russian military columns took place across the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, which indicates the actual loss of sovereignty of Belarus in military policy. The deployment of Russian military bases on the territory of Belarus, as well as the holding of regular joint exercises in border areas, create additional tension. Russia's military presence in Belarus threatens the northern regions of Ukraine, including Kyiv, which is located in relative proximity

to the border. This forces Ukraine to strengthen its defense capabilities in the north, spending significant resources [31].

The Ukrainian-Russian border has been a focal point of geopolitical tension since Ukraine gained independence in 1991. Stretching over 2,295 kilometers, it is the longest land border Ukraine shares with any country. Historically, this border has been a zone of economic and cultural exchange, but it has also become a flashpoint for conflict and aggression, particularly since 2014. The Ukrainian-Russian border reflects centuries of shared history, marked by both cooperation and domination. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this border became an international frontier, symbolizing Ukraine's sovereignty. However, Russia has consistently challenged Ukraine's independence, viewing the country as part of its sphere of influence. This perspective is rooted in imperialistic narratives that frame Ukraine as a «historical part» of Russia. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the onset of the war in Donbas escalated tensions to an unprecedented level. Russia's refusal to recognize Ukraine's territorial integrity, coupled with its support for separatist movements, has transformed the border into a de facto conflict zone (Figure 2.1) [20]




Figure 2.1- Ukraine geographically stable borders by rivers (in red).

The conflict along the Ukrainian-Russian border has severely impacted trade and economic ties. Prior to 2014, Russia was one of Ukraine's largest trading partners. The disruption of supply chains and blockades of Ukrainian exports, particularly through ports in the Azov and Black Seas, have inflicted significant economic damage on Ukraine.

The Ukrainian-Russian border is not only a regional issue but also a global one. It represents a frontline in the broader struggle between democratic and authoritarian systems. Russia's aggression has drawn widespread condemnation from the international community, leading to sanctions and increased NATO presence in Eastern Europe.

From a geopolitical point of view, Ukraine does not have an eastern border. There is only a front line. This is determined by geographical and cultural factors of geopolitics. About this problem author the author of the term «geopolitics» R. Chellen wrote a hundred years ago in his 1915 work «Political Problems of the World War». R. Chellen analyzes the causes of the war and its potential consequences, emphasizing that one of its primary objectives should be resolving the issues of Eastern Europe. The fate of all of Europe will depend on the long-term balance of power and border configurations established by the war. A key feature of this conflict, he argues, is the rise of racism as a new force in world history, with Russia entering the war under the openly racist banner of ensuring pan-Slavic racial and political unity. However, the events revealed that the real source of conflict in Eastern Europe was not «racial animosity between Germans and Slavs», but rather a clash between Russia's «Asiatic boundlessness of the will to power» driven by a primitive and ethically questionable racial ideology, and the far superior principles of culture, development, and civilization. Racial solidarity played no role in this struggle, as peoples of Europe united to defend high European values against Russian aggression, proving that «racial unity is an illusion» The Slavs' sense of belonging to European culture and Russia's attempts to transform Pan-Slavism into Pan-Russism led them to join in the pan-European effort against Russia,

demonstrating the «bankruptcy of Pan-Slavism as a political force» Chellen argues that Russia's entry into the war was driven by its desire to annex Western Ukrainian lands, using Pan-Slavist rhetoric to disguise its true motives, and he views the «Ukrainian question» as one of the central contradictions that led to the war: «We have... every reason to include the Ukrainian question among the main causes of the world war» [47].

In his post-war work «Great Powers and the World Crisis» (1920), R. Chellen outlines his perspective on the challenges facing Eastern Europe. He argues that Soviet Russia, emerging from the legacy of «Mongol-colored Muscovite tsarism» is the direct successor of old Russia, representing «the reverse side of Europe, intertwined with the reverse side of Asia».

Chellen rejects comparisons between the multi-ethnic United States and the «Russia of a Hundred Nations» emphasizing two key differences: the geographical positioning of the peoples and their cultural diversity. The first feature is the central role of the «Great Russians», who are surrounded on all sides by various foreign peoples, including Swedes, Finns, Estonians, Germans, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Ruthenians, and Romanians in the West. He also notes that Ruthenians, or «Little Russians», are considered foreign in this context. Culturally, Chellen argues, Russian domination over these peoples amounted to «the imposition of a lower culture over a higher one» This control was maintained through «a policy of systematic oppression of the more advanced peoples along the European border» and artificial, forced mixing—unlike the natural assimilation in America. This strategy aimed to dismantle the buffer zone between Russia and Europe, allowing Russia to surge into the West. According to Chellen, this embodies the core of the Russian idea [46].

Another classic author of geopolitics is Halford John Mackinder. H. Mackinder made a notably important contribution to geopolitical theory with his concept of a fixed division of the world into distinct zones, each playing a specific role in history. In his brief 1904 article «The Geographical Pivot of History» he challenges the Eurocentric perspective of history and presents a hypothesis that the

true driving force behind historical processes and global changes lies in the human populations of the central-northern Eurasian landmass, including the Middle East. This region, which he later referred to as the «pivot area» or «Heartland» is the core of his theory.

Looking back through the centuries, Mackinder concludes that the only constant in world history is the ongoing pressure from the Middle Earth on its outer edges. This pressure makes the existence of the world, including Europe, dependent on Eurasia, with general history being shaped by its influence. Mackinder argues that world history is essentially a byproduct of Eurasian history, which led him to describe the Heartland as the «geographical axis of history» This region, although removed from history and closed off to it, inspires and triggers the historical process revolving around the central Eurasian pole.

According to Mackinder, the end of the Mongols' undivided rule in the Heartland marked the beginning of the modern era, with Russia assuming many of their functions. «Russia takes the place of the Mongol Empire» Mackinder writes. Russia's influence over Finland, Scandinavia, Poland, Turkey, Persia, India, and China replaced the Mongols' centrifugal raids from the steppes. He believed that no social revolution would significantly alter Russia's fundamental relationship with the geographical boundaries of its existence. Mackinder viewed the greatest threat to world democracy and freedom, ensured by the supremacy of the outer Eurasian region over its core, not as coming directly from the core, but from the potential alliance of Eurasia's vast resources with the intellectual and organizational strength of powers from the surrounding crescent regions. He considered the possible alliance between Russia and Germany to be both the most likely and the most catastrophic scenario (Figure 2.2) [54].



Figure 2.2 – Mackinder’s Heartland theory visualization [55]

Upon examining historical processes more closely, Mackinder refines his view of the driving forces on the «World Island» — the entire Eurasian landmass. He argues that the key to accessing Heartland lies in Eastern Europe, making control over this region of utmost geostrategic importance. It was at this point that Mackinder famously stated: «Whoever controls Eastern Europe controls Heartland; whoever controls Heartland controls the World Island; whoever controls the World Island controls the world.»

Although Mackinder did not recognize Ukraine as an independent state in his book «Democratic Ideals», the map included in the work shows its name alongside the names of seven other regions, without a defined border. However, he did advocate for the creation of an independent Ukraine in his recommendations to the government. As a British High Commissioner, Mackinder visited Odessa and Novorossiysk on behalf of Foreign Minister D. Curzon, where he met with key politicians and military leaders, including Denikin. He attempted (unsuccessfully) to convince Denikin to de facto recognize the newly established states and to collaborate with the Poles against the Bolsheviks. In a report to the government and a speech at a cabinet meeting, Mackinder proposed forming «an alliance of border states»—those that had gained independence after the Russian Empire collapsed, including Ukraine—and suggested creating a league of these states in cooperation

with Eastern European countries. He also argued for the formation of a broad anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevik coalition in Eastern Europe. However, Mackinder's plan was ultimately rejected by the government [53] [61].

B. Blouet observes that short-sighted politicians, focused primarily on the upcoming elections, were unable to properly recognize the value of the proposal, which was based on a futurist analysis looking 25 years ahead. He also argues that England's stance was one of the factors that contributed to the collapse of the young Ukrainian state: «When Britain withdrew, it took with it the support that many potentially independent regions, including Ukraine, had hoped for» [24].

So the main challenge for Ukraine is its strategic location. To deter the eastern threat, Ukraine as a state needs to have an eastern geopolitically stable geographical border (which would be a geographical obstacle). Variants of part of such a border are the rivers - the Seversky Donets and the Don. In the variant of drawing the border along the Seversky Donets, such large cities as Kharkiv and Luhansk will be near the border, as well as the eastern part of the Kharkiv region and the northern Luhansk region, the region will remain behind the river. Another stable border is the Don River - it is wide enough to maintain defense. However, this river is entirely located on the territory of the Russian Federation. Accordingly, there are no other options for the Ukrainian state - either to have a geopolitically unstable border, or to give up part of the territory, or to create a buffer zone on the territory of Russia. However, all three options are unrealistic in modern geopolitical realities [24].

Another approach to solving this problem is the economic border. The stronger the economy of the Ukrainian state, the more realistic it seems to create artificial obstacles on the border. The economic border can pass not only by land, but also by sea - so military-economic dominance can destroy the only strategic outlet of the Russian Federation to the sea - namely the Black Sea ports of the Russian Federation. When the Black Sea regions of the Russian Federation do not have economic development, are cut off from foreign trade, and become unprofitable for the maintenance of the Russian Federation, and the Black Sea Fleet cannot be serviced, it will be possible to observe an outflow of population from these territories

(closing the «Caspian Gate»). Accordingly, the threat in the Black Sea will decrease. On the other hand, the desolation of these regions creates problems with the logistics of the future military offensive of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which is an absolute plus. This is the buffer zone in the southeast. However, such an option is possible only if Ukraine retains Crimea. With the northeastern border - it is much more difficult. However, with Belarus as an ally of Ukraine, this problem is much easier to solve than the threat that the Russian Federation poses now.

According to Table 2.1, the countries of the European Union are the main trading partners of Ukraine. They occupy a key position in Ukraine's foreign trade, providing a significant part of its export and import operations. This includes both goods and services, which contributes to the economic development and integration of Ukraine into the European economic space. Close economic ties with the EU are also important for attracting investment, technology and the development of strategic sectors of the Ukrainian economy [26]

Table 2.1 – Exports of goods from Ukraine in millions of USD [37]

Country	Year				
	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Poland	3296,54	3275,09	4979,11	6694,96	4718,98
Romania	1005,65	1081,78	1500,26	3904,66	3756,24
China	3593,68	7117,75	7992,49	2489,55	2400,92
Turkey	2619,06	2435,43	3999,61	2947,35	2369,06
Germany	2383,39	2072,62	2789,94	2270,44	2008,03
Spain	1500,80	1249,41	1639,83	1577,49	2000,13
Italy	2418,88	1925,38	3240,25	1652,52	1531,60
The Netherlands	1848,43	1808,78	2128,42	1544,17	1483,49
Hungary	1562,81	1263,96	1583,35	2276,91	1177,75
Egypt	2254,10	1617,94	1909,98	807,99	1084,44

The overall trade landscape with Ukraine has seen considerable fluctuations across EU countries, with certain countries like Poland, Romania, and Spain showing resilience and growth, while others like China, Germany, and Egypt experienced significant declines, particularly after 2021. These changes reflect evolving geopolitical factors and shifts in global trade dynamics.

A huge problem is Ukraine's economy and its foreign policy relations with partner countries. The work does not research the cultural component, but the economic component, which as of the end of 2024 is completely dependent on partner countries.

The exact amount of foreign aid is currently not possible to calculate, but given Ukraine's budget for 2025, foreign partners completely support Ukraine's economy: revenues are set at 2045 billion hryvnias, and defense expenditures alone amount to 2224 billion hryvnias. Accordingly, the remaining parts of the expenditures are covered by foreign partners. That is why it is important to analyze a possible strategy for Ukraine's geopolitical development. [3].

Strategically, Ukraine faces a stark choice regarding its eastern border. While natural obstacles like rivers could theoretically serve as stable boundaries, the current geopolitical realities render such options unfeasible. Instead, Ukraine must focus on strengthening its economic resilience and forging stronger alliances to mitigate external threats. Economic dominance in regions like the Black Sea, combined with robust trade ties with the European Union, offers a pathway to secure its borders indirectly by weakening adversaries' strategic footholds. Moreover, Ukraine's reliance on foreign aid underscores the intertwined nature of its economic and geopolitical stability. With defense expenditures exceeding national revenues, the support of international partners becomes critical for sustaining Ukraine's sovereignty and defense capabilities. This dependence not only highlights the need for sustainable economic growth but also calls for a strategic reevaluation of Ukraine's role in the global geopolitical landscape. Ultimately, Ukraine's survival and success depend on its ability to navigate complex geopolitical currents. By leveraging its strategic location, enhancing economic self-reliance, and fostering strong alliances, Ukraine can transform its vulnerabilities into opportunities, securing its future in a volatile and interconnected world.

2.2 Geopolitical vector of Ukraine: possible scenarios and development strategy of the country.

Ukraine's foreign economic policy plays a crucial role in shaping its long-term development trajectory and integration into the global economy. Positioned at the crossroads of major geopolitical and trade routes, Ukraine faces both significant opportunities and challenges in defining its economic strategy. The country's policy decisions in this sphere must balance its aspirations for European integration, its economic relationships with neighboring countries, and its strategic partnerships with global powers.

It is impossible to talk about any geopolitical development of Ukraine now because of the war. The ongoing war, decline of Ukraine economic and global economic instability have underscored the need for a dynamic and adaptive approach to foreign economic policy. This includes addressing critical issues such as diversifying export markets, improving trade infrastructure, and enhancing investment attractiveness. Additionally, Ukraine's ability to leverage its agricultural potential, technological innovation, and strategic location will be key in ensuring sustainable growth. This section examines potential scenarios for the development of Ukraine's foreign economic policy, exploring the strategic paths available to the country. By analyzing the external geopolitical environment in first section, it seeks to propose actionable recommendations for enhancing Ukraine's position in the international economic system.

According to the World Bank, Ukraine needs at least \$486 billion to recover over the next 10 years. This is a very large sum, even for a country like Ukraine. However, with foreign support from other countries and international organizations, this amount is recoverable [68].

An important factor in ensuring international support is the right international policy. The only right international policy is one that fully covers the state's need for

international policy. However, no country has a universal approach, so the right policy is considered to be the most effective policy in any direction.

Ukraine's foreign policy is characterized by a lack of diplomatic instruments and resources to implement long-term goals. An insufficient number of diplomatic missions, a lack of professional staff, and limited funding create barriers to effective work in the international arena. Russia actively uses disinformation as a tool to influence international opinion on Ukraine. Information attacks aimed at discrediting the Ukrainian authorities undermine international support and create internal political tension. There is also a need for greater coordination between Ukraine's foreign policy bodies. Lack of strategic planning and insufficient communication between different agencies often lead to duplication of efforts or the absence of a unified approach to addressing key issues [59].

Solving these problems by itself is impossible, so let's discard these problems and assume that Ukraine's foreign policy will have only one direction of work, taking into account the scenarios that are possible in the near future.

1) Stalemate. Ukraine cannot return the territories occupied by the Russian Federation, and the Russian Federation cannot advance further. The economies of both countries are exhausted. No aid is provided to Ukraine, but sanctions are imposed on Russia / or aid is provided to Ukraine, but without sanctions against the Russian Federation. In such a scenario, Russia will eventually regain the ability to attack, but Ukraine can establish stable international ties - for example, have guarantees from NATO for part of the territory of Ukraine. This scenario is the most uncertain for Ukraine due to the cessation of the conflict for a certain time. Such uncertainty will lead to a decrease in the country's investment potential and a deep economic and political crisis.

2) Diplomatic ceasefire. Negotiations are underway on Ukraine's accession to NATO, but part of Ukraine is still occupied by the Russian Federation. A relatively good scenario for Ukraine, but in this case, it is very important to work on deepening Ukrainian influence in NATO and EU structures in order to lobby Ukraine's interests for further preparation of resistance.

3) Ukraine's victory, scenario 1. Ukraine successfully repels the Russian offensive. Negotiations are underway, as a result of which the Russian Federation retains the occupied territories, but the Russian Federation is so exhausted that the time for its recovery will be longer than the time for Ukraine to prepare for the next phase of the war. «Hybrid» security guarantees from the USA and/or France and Great Britain, such as the introduction of peacekeeping troops. In this scenario, Ukraine's foreign policy should be built through Ukraine's influence on partner countries, namely lobbying Ukrainian interests and soft influence on partners economically. The priority for Ukraine's development in this scenario is a huge focus on the economy, namely Ukraine's full entry into the global market and increasing the production of strategic resources on the territory of Ukraine (such as microprocessors in Taiwan. For Ukraine, these may be the latest technologies, given the large IT sector and the development of military infrastructure).

4) Ukraine's victory, scenario 2. Ukraine successfully repels the Russian offensive. As in any empire that has lost the war, internal conflicts and instability begin in the Russian Federation. At this time, Ukraine needs to distribute its resources of influence as effectively as possible - part of it on partner countries and strengthening its own economy, part - on strengthening separatist movements in the Russian Federation. The return of the occupied territories by military means is possible.

5) Ukraine's victory, scenario 3. «Time of Troubles». Ukraine successfully repels the Russian offensive. As in any empire that has lost the war, internal conflicts and instability begin in the Russian Federation, but due to the weakness of the power vertical, the conflicts become completely uncontrolled. At this time, Ukraine needs to distribute its resources of influence as effectively as possible - some on partner countries and strengthening its own economy, and some on strengthening separatist movements in the Russian Federation in order to control their politics. It is possible to return the occupied territories by military means, as well as establish a buffer zone. It is possible to influence quasi-state entities on the territory of the Russian Federation, but it is very important to distribute the resources

of influence both on influence on partners and potential partners. In this scenario, Ukraine has every chance of becoming a regional actor and taking away all of the Russian Federation's influence in Eastern Europe.

6) The end of the Ukrainian state. The worst-case scenario and the collapse of the modern international system, which de facto leads to the collapse of NATO and American influence in Europe. There can be no discussion about the directions of foreign policy in this scenario. If Ukraine falls, even with the preservation of Right-Bank Ukraine, the next war will be waged directly against European countries [38] [39].

The only good scenarios for Ukraine are scenarios 2, 3, 4 and 5. It makes no sense to consider other scenarios due to the actual collapse of Ukraine as a state in these scenarios. Therefore, it is possible to analyze the geopolitical and foreign economic priorities for the future of Ukraine only from these scenarios. The main capital of the state is people and the resources that provide for them. Accordingly, Ukraine first of all needs to create favorable conditions for the life of its citizens.

The war has displaced over six million people from Ukraine, approximately 15% of the country's pre-war population, creating a significant gap in its workforce. Even after the conflict ends, this mass migration is expected to result in a severe labor shortage. However, forced migration can also offer an economic opportunity for those affected by the war. It provides vital shelter and safety, while also allowing children to continue their education and work towards a better future. Adults from Ukraine may also take advantage of this opportunity, likely learning the language of their new country and acquiring new skills to thrive in their new surroundings [45].

Ukraine has managed to prevent bureaucratic collapse, with most public services still accessible, thanks to a significant increase in digitalization since the Covid-19 pandemic. However, achieving successful recovery will require exceptional effort and innovation from the government. Moving forward, government must work to implement the structural changes that other European nations have been pursuing for years, but in a much shorter timeframe. These changes include adopting low-carbon production, enhancing the energy efficiency

of the economy, and leveraging advancements in information technology and fintech to improve public services. But to create a powerful economy, you need to create a real economy - build factories and train specialists. Historically, the industrialization of Ukraine in the 20th century was built with the blood of Ukrainians, but the real sphere of the economy was destroyed by inept privatization and the fall of part of the economy into the hands of oligarchs [13] [32] [41].

Therefore, to restore the economy of Ukraine, it is important to focus resources on two areas:

1) developing the real sector of the economy, namely factories to increase production with high added value.

2) developing a transparent system of the digital economy, namely finance and exchanges, more convenient and transparent access to the Ukrainian stock market. This is necessary for the implementation of the first point. Accordingly, both of these points cannot be implemented sequentially, but simultaneously, while maintaining a balance between the two sectors of the economy.

The development of the real economy, with increased production and processing of resources on the ground, will create great potential for high-tech production and foreign investment. The implementation of a transparent investment system will affect foreign and domestic investors. From a resource point of view, Ukraine is rich in minerals. Thus, more than 40% of our country's oil and gas reserves are concentrated in the areas of the shelves of the Black and Azov Seas. This is one of the reasons for the attractiveness of this region for the Russian Federation [21][36].

Ukraine has the largest titanium resources and reserves in Europe. The state balance of mineral reserves of Ukraine takes into account 15 titanium deposits (out of 40), which have a high degree of exploration and industrial development. The deposits are located within the Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zhytomyr regions and are confined to the Ukrainian Shield and the Dnieper-Donetsk cavity. The deposits are alluvial, residual and indigenous [9] [11].

Ukraine has significant reserves and promising lithium resources associated with rare-metal granite pegmatites of the Proterozoic. In the Western Azov region, the Kruta Balka and Shevchenkivske deposits have been explored. In the central part of the Ukrainian Shield, in the Shpolyano-Tashlyk ore region, there are the Polokhivske, Stankuvatske, Nadiya and the Lipnyazky deposit. The Polokhivske lithium (petalite ore) deposit (Kirovohrad region) is considered the most promising [9] [11].

Currently, Ukraine has no known reserves of platinum group metals. However, there are promising prospects for discovering these metals in various geological formations, supported by over 50 years of research. This began in 1951, when concentrations of 0.1-0.2 g/t of platinum were found in the hyperbasites of the Azov region near the Obitichna River. Several geological areas are considered promising for exploration, including the Precambrian mafic-ultramafic complexes of the Ukrainian Shield, the alpine hyperbasites of the Carpathians, the Riphean trap formation with native copper in Volyn, ultramafic and iron ore formations of Kryvbas, potash-rich rare-metal and rare-earth metasomatites in the central and northwestern parts of the Ukrainian Shield, beresite-listvenite gold-bearing metasomatites in the greenstone structures of the Middle Dnieper, ore-bearing skarns of the Middle Bug, coal-bearing red-colored sediments and metasomatites of the Donbas, and weathering crusts on the basic-ultrabasic massifs of the Ukrainian Shield [18].

Ukraine has the following bauxite reserves: total estimated at 70 million tons, confirmed — approx. 19 million tons (0.1% of the world) (A+B+C1, Vysokopil deposit). Reserves of other known deposits (Nikopol and Smilyanske) have not been calculated. The search for bauxite in Transnistria region is promising (Figure 2.3) [9].




Figure 2.3 – Map of Ukraine's resources for further development [66]

These resources are the basis for establishing a powerful economy, but it is important to focus not only on extracting these resources, but also on processing these resources precisely on the territory of Ukraine. With the arrival of foreign investors, Ukraine will receive lobbying of its interests from donor countries, which will be a kind of security guarantee (as is currently the case in Taiwan from the USA). That is why it is important to implement a high-quality and transparent investment system with the subsequent reconstruction of the economy with a focus on processing resources precisely on the territory of Ukraine [60][63].

Ukraine's geopolitical situation is shaped by ongoing military aggression from Russia, its aspirations for integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, and its role as a key transit hub for trade and energy. The country's priorities include safeguarding its sovereignty, enhancing security, and promoting economic development through closer ties with Western allies.

The full-scale invasion by Russia in 2022 has reinforced Ukraine's alignment with the European Union and NATO, while also intensifying global support for Ukraine's resistance. However, the war has also revealed vulnerabilities, such as economic dependence on foreign aid, energy insecurity, and logistical challenges posed by a lack of natural defensive borders in the East.

Ukraine must adopt a multifaceted strategy that prioritizes sovereignty, security, and sustainable development. The basic strategy consists of 6 points, but the extended strategy probably goes far beyond the scope of this work:

1) **Strengthening Defense Capabilities.** Ukraine must continue modernizing its military and enhancing border security, particularly along the eastern and northern frontiers. Partnerships with NATO and allied nations are essential for acquiring advanced technologies and training.

a) **Economic Resilience and Diversification.** Reducing economic dependence on external aid and developing a self-reliant economy are critical.

Ukraine should focus on

b) **Expanding trade with the EU and other global markets.**

c) **Investing in high-value sectors such as IT, production, and renewable energy.**

d) **Enhancing infrastructure to improve connectivity and trade logistics.**

3) **Regional and Global Partnerships.** Building regional alliances with countries like Poland, Romania, and Turkey can bolster Ukraine's geopolitical position. Active participation in initiatives like the Three Seas Initiative and Black Sea cooperation can enhance regional stability and economic integration.

4) **Energy Security.** Diversification of energy supplies, development of domestic resources, and investments in renewable energy will reduce Ukraine's reliance on Russian energy imports. Collaborations with the EU on energy projects can also improve resilience [35][36].

5) **Diplomatic Efforts.** Ukraine must maintain robust diplomatic engagement to garner international support. Strengthening its presence in international organizations and advocating for sanctions against aggressors are key components.

6) **Enhancing Governance and Rule of Law.** Effective governance and anti-corruption measures are prerequisites for deeper integration with the EU and NATO. Transparent policies will attract foreign investment and improve public trust.

In conclusion, geopolitical position of Ukraine remains a central factor in shaping its domestic and foreign policy, driven by ongoing military aggression from Russia, aspirations for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and its pivotal role as a transit hub for trade and energy. The war that escalated in 2022 has amplified the need for a coherent and multifaceted strategy to address Ukraine's vulnerabilities while building on its strengths. Despite significant challenges, including economic dependence on foreign aid, energy insecurity, and logistical issues stemming from its geographical location, Ukraine has demonstrated resilience and a clear alignment with Western democratic values. The unwavering support from international partners and the country's commitment to structural reforms offer a foundation for overcoming these obstacles and ensuring sustainable development. The main challenge is to modernize the economy in such a difficult geopolitical situation, which is a rather serious but surmountable challenge.

CONCLUSIONS

Geopolitics as a science makes it possible to determine stable priorities for the country, and is of crucial importance for the overall national security and sustainable development of the country, including economic development.

Were investigated the geopolitical and foreign economic priorities of Ukraine's development in the face of modern challenges and threats. The analysis confirmed that Ukraine has a unique strategic position, which, on the one hand, opens up wide opportunities for integration into the European and global economic space, and on the other hand, creates serious risks due to its proximity to aggressive geopolitical actors.

The paper considers possible scenarios for the development of geopolitics and foreign economic policy of Ukraine. In particular, it was determined that the strategic priority is integration into the EU and NATO, which will not only contribute to increasing the level of security and protecting the country's sovereignty, but also ensure the strengthening of democratic institutions, the rule of law and governance standards. Membership in these structures will open access to modern technologies, new markets and financial resources, stimulating the attraction of foreign direct investment. This will allow creating a more stable economic system capable of effectively responding to the challenges of the global economy.

At the same time, maintaining multi-vector diplomacy is an important component of foreign policy, as it allows Ukraine to maintain constructive relations with various countries and regional associations. Active participation in regional initiatives, such as the Three Seas Initiative, the development of cooperation with neighboring countries, in particular Poland, Romania and Turkey, strengthen Ukraine's position as an important geopolitical player in Central and Eastern Europe. This will contribute to improving transport and energy infrastructure, integration into regional markets and ensuring strategic stability.

Particular attention is paid to the need to strengthen the country's economic resilience through investments in high-tech industries, which can become drivers of

economic growth. Creating a favorable business climate for innovative companies and stimulating startups will allow Ukraine to develop competitive sectors of the economy. It is important to develop exports of goods with high added value, which will allow diversifying the export structure, reducing dependence on raw materials and increasing foreign exchange earnings.

Reforming the energy sector, including diversifying sources of supply, switching to renewable energy sources and increasing energy efficiency, are key areas for ensuring energy security. The implementation of these measures will contribute not only to reducing dependence on energy imports, but also to strengthening the economy's resilience to external shocks.

Thus, Ukraine, despite numerous challenges, has significant potential to implement its geopolitical and foreign economic priorities. Thanks to a strategic approach based on national interests, active cooperation with international partners, the implementation of reforms and strengthening of institutional capacity, the country will be able to ensure sustainable development. This will be a guarantee of strengthening its positions on a regional and global scale, creating conditions for a secure and prosperous future.

REFERENCES

1. Безсмертний Р. П. Балто-чорноморський союз: перспективи для України. *Міжнародні відносини: теоретико-практичні аспекти*. 2019. No. 4. P. 8–15. URL: <https://doi.org/10.31866/2616-745x.4.2019.177614> (date of access: 09.12.2024).
2. Бойко З. В. Регіональні особливості етнічних процесів за переписами населення України 1989 та 2001 років. *Наукові записки тернопільського національного педагогічного університету імені володимира гнатюка. серія: географія*. 2016. No. 2 (вип. 41). P. 99–104.
3. Бюджет України на 2025 рік. *Міністерство Фінансів України*. URL: https://mof.gov.ua/uk/budget_of_2025-770 (date of access: 10.12.2024).
4. Всеукраїнський перепис населення України за 2001 рік. *Державний комітет статистики України*. URL: <https://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
5. Горбулін докладно проаналізував, як Росія роками готувалася до агресії проти України. Навіть масова культура - елемент війни. *Texty.org.ua - статті та журналістика даних для людей – Тексти.org.ua*. URL: https://texty.org.ua/fragments/65583/Gorbulin_dokladno_proanalizuvav_jak_Rosija_rokamy_gotuvalasa-65583/ (date of access: 08.12.2024).
6. Дністрянський М. Політична географія України : навчальний посібник. Львів : ЛНУ імені Івана Франка, 2014. 348 р. URL: https://geography.lnu.edu.ua/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/politgeoukr_small.pdf (date of access: 08.12.2024).
7. Квітницький М. Половці. *Енциклопедія історії України : Енциклопедія / ed. by В. Смолій*. Київ, 2013. Vol. 8. P. 350. URL: <http://www.history.org.ua/?termin=Polovtsi> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
8. Липа Ю. Розподіл росії. 2nd ed. Київ : Українська видавнича справа, 2022. 224 р.

9. Мала гірнича енциклопедія : Енциклопедія / ред. В. Білецький. Донецьк : Донбас, 2007. Т. 2. 670 с.
10. Мельникова І. Договір між срср і республікою польща про радянсько-польський державний кордон 1945. *Енциклопедія історії України* : Енциклопедія / ed. by В. Смолій. Київ, 2013. Vol. 2. P. 428. URL: http://resource.history.org.ua/cgi-bin/eiu/history.exe?&I21DBN=EIU&P21DBN=EIU&S21STN=1&S21REF=10&S21FMT=eiu_all&C21COM=S&S21CNR=20&S21P01=0&S21P02=0&S21P03=TRN=&S21COLORTERMS=0&S21STR=Dogovir_SRSR_i_Polshchy_pro_kordon (date of access: 08.12.2024).
11. Примушко С., Величко В. Мінеральні ресурси України. Київ : ДНВП «Геоінформ України», 2021. 270 р. URL: https://geoinf.kiev.ua/wp/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/m_r_2021.pdf (date of access: 08.12.2024).
12. Про Основні напрями зовнішньої політики України : Постанова Верховної Ради України of 02.07.1993 no. 3360-XII : as of 20 July 2010. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3360-12#Text> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
13. Прохоров Б., Яблоновський Д. Велика та мала. Шлях приватизації від невдач до прозорості. *VoxUkraine* | «Вокс Україна» – більше ніж найкраща аналітика про Україну. URL: <https://voxukraine.org/velika-ta-mala-shlyah-privatizatsiyi-vid-nevdach-do-prozorosti> (date of access: 13.12.2024).
14. Синиця Є. Шлях "із варягів у греки". *Енциклопедія історії України* : Енциклопедія / ed. by В. Смолій. Київ, 2013. Vol. 10. P. 645. URL: <http://history.org.ua/LiberUA/978-966-00-1359-9/978-966-00-1359-9.pdf> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
15. Спільна декларація міністрів закордонних справ України, Республіки Польща та Литовської Республіки щодо заснування Люблінського трикутника. 2020. URL: <https://mfa.gov.ua/news/spilna-deklaraciya-ministriv-zakordonnih-sprav-ukrayini-respubliki-polshcha-ta-litovskoyi-respubliki-shchodo-zasnuvannya-lyublinskogo-trikutnika> (date of access: 08.12.2024).

16. Торопчинова К. Україна: транспорт. *ВУЕ*. URL: https://vue.gov.ua/Україна:_транспорт (date of access: 08.12.2024).
17. Угода про асоціацію між Україною, з однієї сторони, та Європейським Союзом, Європейським співтовариством з атомної енергії і їхніми державами-членами, з іншої сторони : Угода Україна of 27.06.2014 : as of 30 November 2023. URL: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/984_011#Text (date of access: 08.12.2024).
18. Українські платинові перспективи: чи є шанс на життя? – Національна асоціація добувної промисловості України. *Національна асоціація добувної промисловості України*. URL: <https://neiau.com.ua/ukraïnski-platinovi-perspektivi-chi-e-shans-na-zhittya/> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
19. Чухліб Т. Андрусівський договір (перемир'я) 1667. *Енциклопедія історії України* : Енциклопедія / ed. by В. Смолій. Київ, 2013. Vol. 1. P. 87–88. URL: http://resource.history.org.ua/cgi-bin/eiu/history.exe?Z21ID=&I21DBN=DOP&P21DBN=EIU&S21STN=1&S21REF=10&S21FMT=eiu_all&C21COM=S&S21CNR=20&S21P01=0&S21P02=0&S21P03=TRN=&S21COLORTERMS=0&S21STR=Andrusivskyj_dohovir_1667 (date of access: 08.12.2024).
20. ABC News. Pro-Russian rebels amass army sufficient for 'mid-sized European state': ukraine defence minister. *ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)*. URL: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-09/ukrainian-rebels-have-army-the-size-of-small-european-state/6530828> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
21. Aligica P. D. The Black Sea region's postwar potential. *GIS Reports*. URL: <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/black-sea-postwar/> (date of access: 13.12.2024).
22. Anderson R. T. European plain | map, location, facts, importance, & description | britannica. *Encyclopedia Britannica*. URL: <https://www.britannica.com/place/European-Plain> (date of access: 08.12.2024).

23. Avoiding the next front: Iraq's fight to stay out of the Israel-Iran conflict. *ECFR*. URL: <https://ecfr.eu/article/avoiding-the-next-front-iraqs-fight-to-stay-out-of-the-israel-iran-conflict/> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
24. Blouet B. W. Sir halford mackinder as british high commissioner to south russia, 1919-1920. *The geographical journal*. 1976. Vol. 142, no. 2. P. 228. URL: <https://doi.org/10.2307/1796597> (date of access: 12.12.2024).
25. Brekhunenko V. Confrontation between the West and Muscovy: Ukrainian-Russian relations during the Hetmanate. *Ban ruscism*. 2023. P. 60–70. URL: <https://doi.org/10.28925/2023.94327br670> (date of access: 13.12.2024).
26. Bulletin of Ukraine – EU trade relations current state. *Ministry of Economy of Ukraine*. URL: <https://me.gov.ua/Documents/Detail?lang=en-GB&id=a6ad9cff-feae-429c-93d6-68dc618435f9&title=BulletinOfUkraineEuTradeRelationsCurrentState> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
27. Changing geopolitics in the arctic. *Council on Foreign Relations*. URL: <https://www.cfr.org/report/changing-geopolitics-arctic-0> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
28. Chernin V. Hungarian irredentism in transcarpathia. *Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies*. URL: <https://besacenter.org/hungarian-irredentism-in-transcarpathia/> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
29. China in the South Pacific: geopolitical competition and local agency. *CIDOB*. URL: <https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/china-south-pacific-geopolitical-competition-and-local-agency> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
30. Ciziunas P. Russia and the baltic states: is russian imperialism dead?. *Comparative strategy*. 2008. Vol. 27, no. 3. P. 287–307. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930802185692> (date of access: 13.12.2024).
31. Coakley A. Lukashenko is letting putin use belarus to attack ukraine. *Foreign Policy*. URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/24/russia-ukraine-war-belarus-chernobyl-lukashenko/> (date of access: 08.12.2024).

32. Council of Europe. Public service in conditions of war is high on the agenda in ukraine - council of europe office in ukraine - www.coe.int. *Council of Europe Office in Ukraine*. URL: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/-/public-service-in-conditions-of-war-is-high-on-the-agenda-in-ukraine> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
33. East european gas analysis - ukrainian gas pipelines. *East European Gas Analysis*. URL: <https://www.eegas.com/ukraine.htm> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
34. Eckert D. Ukrainian border: current state and problems. *Bulletin of taras shevchenko national university of kyiv. geography*. 2019. No. 75. P. 24–28. URL: <https://doi.org/10.17721/1728-2721.2019.75.4> (date of access: 14.12.2024).
35. Energy and energy security | Ukraine | U.S. agency for international development. *U.S. Agency for International Development*. URL: <https://www.usaid.gov/ukraine/energy-and-energy-security> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
36. Energy security – Ukraine energy profile – Analysis - IEA. *IEA*. URL: <https://www.iea.org/reports/ukraine-energy-profile/energy-security> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
37. Export statistics of Ukraine. *IMF Data*. URL: <https://data.imf.org/?sk=9d6028d4-f14a-464c-a2f2-59b2cd424b85&sid=1515619375491> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
38. Farrell F. How will Russia's war in Ukraine end? The good, the bad, and the ugly scenarios. *The Kyiv Independent*. URL: <https://kyivindependent.com/how-will-russia-war-in-ukraine-end/> (date of access: 13.12.2024).
39. Fix L. Summaries of defeat or win scenarios for 2030 prepared by experts for the 20th YES annual meeting - news - yalta european strategy (YES). *Ялтинська Європейська Стратегія (YES)*. URL: <https://yes-ukraine.org/en/news/summaries-of-defeat-or-win-scenarios-for-2030> (date of access: 08.12.2024).

40. Geopolitics: Sino-Africa must be equal partners. *Friedrich Naumann Foundation*. URL: <https://www.freiheit.org/simbabwe/sino-africa-must-be-equal-partners> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
41. Harasymiw B., Liber G. O. Soviet nationality policy, urban growth, and identity change in the ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934. *Russian review*. 1995. Vol. 54, no. 2. P. 306. URL: <https://doi.org/10.2307/130949> (date of access: 09.12.2024).
42. Imamova N. Central asian trade corridor gains interest amid regional tensions. *Voice of America*. URL: <https://www.voanews.com/a/central-asian-trade-corridor-gains-interest-amid-regional-tensions-/7390284.html> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
43. Joint declaration of the ninth summit of the three seas initiative. *Three Seas Summit Vilnius 2024*. URL: <https://3seas.eu/media/news/joint-declaration-of-the-ninth-summit-of-the-three-seas-initiative> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
44. Kendall-Taylor A. The axis of upheaval: how the convergence of russia, china, iran, and north korea will challenge the US and europe - ICDS. *ICDS*. URL: <https://icds.ee/en/the-axis-of-upheaval-how-the-convergence-of-russia-china-iran-and-north-korea-will-challenge-the-us-and-europe/> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
45. Kilfoyle M. Ukraine: what's the global economic impact of Russia's invasion? - Economics Observatory. *Economics Observatory*. URL: <https://www.economicsobservatory.com/ukraine-whats-the-global-economic-impact-of-russias-invasion> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
46. Kjellén R. Die Großmächte und die Weltkrise. Wiesbaden : Vieweg+Teubner Verlag, 1921. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-16105-9> (date of access: 12.12.2024).
47. Kjellén R. Die politischen Probleme des Weltkrieges. B.G. Teubner, 1916.
48. Kostina Y. Ukraine stops russian gas transit to europe: russia threatens with consequences, but there will definitely be no catastrophe. *zaborona.com*. URL: <https://zaborona.com/en/ukraine-stops-russian-gas-transit-to-europe-russia->

threatens-with-consequences-but-there-will-definitely-be-no-catastrophe/ (date of access: 08.12.2024).

49. Kotoulas I. E., Puztai W. GEOPOLITICS OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE. june 2022 report № 4. Athens : Foreign Affairs Institute, 2022. 76 p. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ioannis-Kotoulas/publication/361583996_Ioannis_E_Kotoulas_Wolfgang_Puztai_Geopolitics_of_the_War_in_Ukraine/links/62bacb14f9dee438e8c826d9/Ioannis-E-Kotoulas-Wolfgang-Puztai-Geopolitics-of-the-War-in-Ukraine.pdf (date of access: 08.12.2024).

50. Kowalski M. Determinants of Ukraine's geopolitical orientation. *Czasopismo geograficzne*. 2022. Vol. 93, no. 3. P. 435–450. URL: <https://doi.org/10.12657/czageo-93-17> (date of access: 13.12.2024).

51. Latin america's global geopolitical projection - latinoamérica 21. *Latinoamérica 21*. URL: <https://latinoamerica21.com/en/latin-americas-global-geopolitical-projection/> (date of access: 08.12.2024).

52. Liu N. Former NATO chief warns against 'axis of autocracies'. *Voice of America*. URL: <https://www.voanews.com/a/former-nato-chief-warns-against-axis-of-autocracies-/7447098.html> (date of access: 08.12.2024).

53. Mackinder H. J. Democratic ideals and reality. New York : Norton, 1962. 278 p.

54. Mackinder H. J. The geographical pivot of history. *The geographical journal*. 1904. Vol. 23, no. 4. P. 421. URL: <https://doi.org/10.2307/1775498> (date of access: 12.12.2024).

55. Mackinder: who rules eastern europe rules the world. *IGES*. URL: <https://iges.ba/en/geopolitics/mackinder-who-rules-eastern-europe-rules-the-world/> (date of access: 08.12.2024).

56. Makio D., Fuccille A. The 2014 russian invasion of crimea: identity and geopolitics. *Revista brasileira de política internacional*. 2023. Vol. 66, no. 1. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329202300113> (date of access: 13.12.2024).

57. Markhulia G. Geohistory and geopolitics around the war in Ukraine. *International scientific journal "the caucasus and the world"*. 2023. URL: <https://doi.org/10.52340/isj.2022.25.09> (date of access: 13.12.2024).
58. Ogryzko V. "Russian" national character. *Ban ruscism*. 2023. P. 47–59. URL: <https://doi.org/10.28925/2023.94327br547> (date of access: 13.12.2024).
59. Pashkov M. Ukraine's foreign policy in the context of geopolitical processes. <https://razumkov.org.ua/>. URL: <https://razumkov.org.ua/images/2024/04/12/2024-PAKT-5.pdf> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
60. Sacks D. Why is Taiwan important to the United States?. *Council on Foreign Relations*. URL: <https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-taiwan-important-united-states> (date of access: 09.12.2024).
61. Shulha M. A. Ukraine from the perspective of geopolitics: re-reading Halford Mackinder. *Scientific journal "regional studies"*. 2019. Vol. 16. P. 131–137. URL: <https://doi.org/10.32782/2663-6170/2019.16.21> (date of access: 14.12.2024).
62. Soloviova E. Geopolitical analysis of Turkey's Black Sea policy. *Грані*. 2023. Vol. 26, no. 3. P. 109–117.
63. Taiwan: an island at the confluence of geopolitics and geo-economics. *Agora Strategy*. URL: <https://www.agora-strategy.com/post/taiwan-an-island-at-the-confluence-of-geopolitics-and-geo-economics> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
64. The geopolitical influence of India and Indonesia in SAARC and ASEAN. *E-International Relations*. URL: <https://www.e-ir.info/2024/09/08/the-geopolitical-influence-of-india-and-indonesia-in-saarc-and-asean/> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
65. The plain, the line, & the gap: Russia's western front. *Encyclopedia Geopolitica*. URL: <https://encyclopediageopolitica.com/2017/10/13/the-plain-the-line-the-gap-russias-western-front/> (date of access: 08.12.2024).
66. UKRAINE: mining investment opportunities. critical raw materials. *Ukrainian Geological Survey*. URL: <https://www.geo.gov.ua/wp->

content/uploads/presentations/en/investment-opportunities-in-exploration-production-strategic-and-critical-minerals.pdf (date of access: 08.12.2024).

67. Ukraine, poland, and lithuania launch lublin triangle, a new regional cooperation initiative - emerging europe. *Emerging Europe*. URL: <https://emerging-europe.com/analysis/ukraine-poland-and-lithuania-launch-lublin-triangle-a-new-regional-cooperation-initiative/> (date of access: 08.12.2024).

68. Ukraine - third rapid damage and needs assessment (RDNA3), february 2022 – december 2023. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2024. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1596/41082> (date of access: 12.12.2024).

69. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, ex-Commander-in-Chief: “World war, it’s already started”. *Ukrainska Pravda*. URL: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/11/23/7485942/> (date of access: 08.12.2024).

70. Zaluzhnyi: World War III has begun, West not prepared for it. *Home page - Ukrainian World Congress*. URL: <https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/world-war-iii-has-begun-west-not-prepared-for-it-says-ukraines-former-military-commander/> (date of access: 08.12.2024).

ANNEXES

SUMMARY

Dzhobava E. Geopolitical and foreign economic priorities for Ukraine's development. – Masters-level Qualification Thesis. Sumy State University, Sumy, 2024.

The master's thesis focuses on the essence of the geopolitical vector and position of Ukraine. The main factors which affect geopolitical position of Ukraine. The main aim of this research is to develop basic geopolitical strategy of Ukraine development and develop systematization of factors that determine geopolitic position of Ukraine.

Keywords: Geopolitics, international economic relations, geopolitical position of Ukraine, foreign priotities of Ukraine, international, foreign economic priorities of Ukraine.