Розвиток методології забезпечення незалежності центральних банків

Abstract

У дисертації наведено теоретичне узагальнення й запропоновано нове вирішення наукової проблеми розвитку теоретико-методологічних засад та методичного інструментарію забезпечення незалежності центральних банків. Структуровано науковий доробок із питань незалежності центральних банків; уточнено логіко-структурні зв’язки, що виникають під час забезпечення незалежності центральних банків; розвинуто методологічне підгрунтя оцінювання незалежності центральних банків; поглиблено методологічні засади визначення біфуркаційного рівня незалежності центральних банків у контексті забезпечення цінової стабільності; досліджено змістовно-логічні взаємозв’язки між незалежністю та транспарентністю центробанків; формалізовано причиннонаслідкові зв’язки між незалежністю центробанку та його транспарентністю; розроблено методологію визначення національних траєкторій комплементарності незалежності центральних банків та їх транспарентності; розроблено методологію та методичний інструментарій визначення ролі національного патерна незалежності центрального банку щодо забезпечення цінової стабільності; удосконалено науково-методологічні засади визначення ролі незалежності центральних банків щодо забезпечення стабільності банківської системи; обгрунтовано специфіку впливу незалежності центральних банків на економічне зростання країни; формалізовано канали впливу макроекономічних детермінант забезпечення незалежності центрального банку; розроблено методологію обгрунтування ролі незалежності центральних банків щодо забезпечення функціонування банківської системи в умовах нестабільності; поглиблено методологію визначення взаємозв’язків між якістю державного регулювання економіки та незалежністю центральних банків з урахуванням соціо-політичних передумов.

The thesis is aimed to develop theoretical basis, methodology and methodical support for central bank independence ensuring. Dynamic and bibliometric analysis of scientific work on central bank independence showed the existence of 10 clusters of contextual dimension of its studying, as well as 10 most powerful international scientific schools that formed the basis of central bank independence research. Content of cross-sectoral studies of central bank independence in the chronological prospect has transformed from analyzing the interaction of the banking and budget systems to studying the role of central bank independence in macrofinancial stability providing. That allowed developing logical-structural scheme of ensuring the independence of the central bank. Integral assessment of central bank independence should combine the parameters of personal, functional, institutional and financial independence, that have to be aggregated taking into account weighting factors that reflect the hierarchical position of each parameter in the central bank independence system. Methodological basis of determining of the central bank independence optimal level in the context of ensuring price stability in the country is improved by justifying the form of functional dependence of inflation on the dynamics of central bank independence. This allowed assessing the critical level of the central bank independence, that is the bifurcation point of change in the trend of its impact on inflation, which creates a scientific basis for developing strategic guidelines for synchronizing anti-inflation policy and the central bank independence ensuring. Theoretical and methodological support for substantiation of logical and structural relationships between independence and transparency of the central bank should be carried out by a systematic combination of types of analysis (trend and bibliometric) and its measurements (subject-chronological and content-contextual). This allowed to structure the scientific work by subjects (public interest and interest of scientists), the chronology of the activation of attention, the scale and direction of cross-sectoral research. Substantiation of the nature of causal links between independence and transparency (both in general and in financial stability reports) of the central bank by Granger causality testing of four hypotheses on unilateral / bilateral links between them with a three-year time lag allowed to establish that the studied connections are not universal and determined by basic rules of functioning of the central bank, but are defined by national specificity of formation of quality of its internal environment. Thus, ensuring the quality of the internal environment of central banks should be formed taking into account the specifics of the complementarity of the mutual influence of their independence and transparency. So, in Ukraine, the strategic guideline for improving the efficiency of the National bank of Ukraine should be aimed at improving its independence while increasing the transparency of financial stability reports. Methodology and methodological tools of determining the role of the national pattern of the central bank independence in achieving price stability is developed through a combination of cluster and panel regression analysis with random effects. This allowed identifying and describing the main patterns of formation of central bank independence, formalizing central bank independence influence to the level of inflation in terms of these patterns, to investigate the change in the potential for inflation regulation of the central bank in different scenarios of central bank independence. The results of the panel regression analysis revealed the lack of a balanced positive effect of increasing the stability of the banking system from the growing independence of the central bank for both Ukraine and the group of 53 countries. At the same time, effective channels for the positive impact of central bank independence on banking stability in countries with a high level of economic freedom are the personal and the financial components of central bank independence. In countries with a low level of economic freedom, the determinant of banking stability is a functional component of ensuring the independence of the central bank. The hypothesis that the influence of central bank independence on the dynamics of economic growth largely depends on the level of welfare of the population and is also manifested in a differentiated way in long-term and short-term perspectives is put forward and empirically confirmed. This creates a scientific basis for improving the reliability and accuracy of state forecasting of socio-economic development and macroeconomic planning. It is theoretically substantiated and empirically confirmed that macroeconomic environment influence on the independence of the National bank of Ukraine through eight channels. It is determined that the catalysts of the central bank's independence are the growth of currency stability and the reduction of the level of fiscal and debt security, and its inhibitors are the extensive growth of the banking sector and foreign trade. A methodology for determining the role of central bank independence in the functioning of the banking system in conditions of financial instability based on a combination of logit-regression modeling and a generalized method of least squares with fixed effects is proposed. This allowed to reject the hypothesis of the preventive role of central bank independence in preventing financial crises, as well as to justify the impact of central bank independence on the parameters of the banking system in periods of instability. Methodological basis for determining the impact of the quality of state regulation of the economy on the level of central bank independence is carried out using panel regression modeling and involves grouping countries by the level of initial conditions of socio-political development. This allowed to substantiate the set of preconditions of maximizing the institutional role of the state in providing central bank independence, as well as to identify the most effective channels for influencing the quality of state regulation of the economy on central bank independence growth depending on national specifics.