Політика адміністрації президента США Дж.Ф. Кеннеді щодо Китаю (вересень 1961 - листопад 1963 рр.)

Abstract

У статті досліджено еволюцію зовнішньої політики адміністрації президента США Дж.Ф. Кеннеді щодо Китаю у вересні 1961 - листопаді 1963 рр. Охарактеризовано причини, хід та наслідки активізації зовнішньополітичної стратегії Вашингтону щодо КНР протягом періоду, що вивчається. Проаналізовано практичну реалізацію зовнішньополітичних ініціатив адміністрації президента США Джона Кеннеді щодо комуністичного Китаю. Висвітлено позицію Білого Дому у протистоянні КНР-КР, а також конкретні зовнішньополітичні дії США щодо Пекіну та Тайбею. Вивчено роль різних угрупувань в американському істеблішменті у процесі реалізації китайської політики адміністрації президента США Дж.Ф. Кеннеді.

The article surveys the evolution of foreign policy of the administration of the US President J.F. Kennedy on China in September 1961 - November 1963. The reasons, course and consequences of the intensification of Washington's foreign policy strategy on China during the investigated period are described. There is analyzed the practical implementation of the foreign policy initiatives of the administration of the President of the United States John F. Kennedy on communist China in September 1961 - November 1963. The role of various groups in the American establishment in the process of implementing the Chinese policy of the US Presidential Administration J.F. Kennedy in September 1961 - November 1963 is studied. The victory of J.F. Kennedy in the presidential election in 1960 was accompanied by a series of changes in the system of geopolitical and military priorities of the United States. The new administration's more realistic approach to China was due primarily to the fact that Beijing, which renounced its alliances and claimed the role of a "third force", was a weak player in the international arena and therefore minor, insignificant deviations from traditional policies of "containment and isolation" seemed acceptable. Moreover, the policy of "isolation" did not justify itself, as China has intensified its foreign policy, established relations with many countries, including the US allies. Gradually, the number of states that supported China's demands for a seat in the UN grew, which created a real prospect for broad recognition of communist China. A number of objective and subjective factors prevented the administration of the 35th President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, from fulfilling his election promises to China and radically changing Washington's Chinese policy. Communist China continued to be recognized as a powerful factor in the US-Soviet dialogue. However, the significant influence on the formation of the US foreign policy of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese lobby, which advocated the preservation of the Eisenhower-Dulles line, significantly limited the activities of supporters of the softening of US-China relations. Eventually, this led to the fact that in 1961-1963, the Chinese strategy of the administration of the US President J.F. Kennedy will be zigzagged, as foreign policy actions were often spontaneous and dependent on various factors. In a strategic context, Washington's policy toward China remained hereditary and unchanged: relations with Beijing were confrontational, and Taipei continued to receive support from the White House. Meanwhile, it is in the last months of John F. Kennedy's presidency that there is a growing trend that will lead to a transformation of the US foreign policy toward China from "containment with isolation" to "containment without isolation". That is why J.F. Kennedy, who did not rule out the possibility of changing China's US policy, saw in his own practical actions toward China at the time no reason to abandon the doctrine of "containment". Particularly, the idea of «containment» of China was the basis of a number of decisions of the John F. Kennedy administration, which eventually led to the escalation of American military intervention in Indochina.