Наукові видання (ННІ БТ)
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Item Efficiency as a new ideology of trust-building corporate governance(Prague Development Center, 2018) Бричко, Марина Михайлівна; Бричко, Марина Михайловна; Brychko, Maryna Mykhailivna; Семеног, Андрій Юрійович; Семеног, Андрей Юрьевич; Semenoh, Andrii YuriiovychThough the ideology of efficiency has been investigated for many centuries, still it has not gained a clear definition and interpretation either in the scientific literature, or in the practice of corporate governance. This paper seeks to examine the mainstream theories of corporate governance in an attempt to suggest that efficient corporate governance has no logical claim to "objectivity" and it does not always contribute to trust-building. The purpose of this paper is to explore the ideology of efficiency, both with respond to its inconsistency and incoherence within trust-building corporate governance. The results suggest that efficiency is ideological and political concept that fails in repairing the breach of trust-building corporate governance. The efficiency as a new ideology of trust-building corporate governance promises to advance our understanding of corporate purpose beyond the old "shareholders-versus-stakeholders" and "shareholders-versus-society" debates.Item Market for corporate control in Ukraine(Business Perspectives, 2003) Костюк, Олександр Миколайович; Костюк, Александр Николаевич; Kostiuk, Oleksandr MykolaiovychThe paper considers the recent trends at the market for corporate control in Ukraine. As a result of the undertaken original research, some very important conclusions have been made. First of all, during 1998-2001 corporate ownership structure in Ukraine became more concentrated, in contrast to such country in transition as Russia. Second, the more concentrated is the ownership structure of Ukrainian companies the lower corporate market performance happens to be. Besides, the group of controllers, who are most efficient in corporate governance, are for-eign institutional investors. Finally, the most active players at the market for corporate control in Ukraine are financial-industrial groups, but their activity in buying shares of Ukrainian companies is not correspondent to the lower degree of efficiency in corporate governance.Item Governance of stakeholder’s financial relationships: evidence fom ukrainian banking sector(Corporate Ownership & Control, 2013) Бричко, Марина Михайлівна; Бричко, Марина Михайловна; Brychko, Maryna MykhailivnaВ статті розроблено економетричну динамічно-лагову модель, яка дозволяє визначити стратегічно важливі фінансові відносини зі стейкхолдерами, виходячи з рівня їх контрольованості керівництвом банку, рівня впливу на зростання вартості банківського бізнесу та з урахуванням часових лагів при їх формуванні та прийнятті управлінських рішень. Отримані результати підтверджують, що ефективність управління діяльністю банку в системі фінансових відносин зі стейкхолдерами досягнуто виключно за рахунок стійких фінансових відносин "принципал-агент", де у ролі принципалів виступають фізичні особи, а агентів – апарат корпоративного управління. Результати проведених досліджень показали, що фізичні та юридичні особи у ролі субагентів, юридичні особи та акціонери у ролі принципалів здійснюють негативний ефект.Item Why Do Some Senior Managers Inflate Firms’ Reported Earnings? Economic Causes and Potential Solutions(Virtus Interpress, 2007) Костюк, Олександр Миколайович; Костюк, Александр Николаевич; Kostiuk, Oleksandr Mykolaiovych; Sridharan, V.G.; Navissi, F.We examine the economic reasons underlying the behavior of some senior managers to inflate their firms’ reported earnings. While the extant literature cites accounting and corporate governance structure as potential reasons that facilitate the inflating tendency, we conjecture that opportunism at different hierarchical levels within firms do not leave much scope for some senior managers to improve firms’ fundamental performance. To protect their personal utility, they resort to inflating tendency, but only if the firms’ corporate governance has loopholes. A major solution offered here is to improve firms’ internal management control system which could reduce within- firm opportunism. However, this solution must accompany improvements to corporate governance.Item Market for Executives in Ukraine(Virtus Interpress, 2005) Костюк, Олександр Миколайович; Костюк, Александр Николаевич; Kostiuk, Oleksandr MykolaiovychTransformation of the structure of corporate ownership in Ukraine should be followed with transformation of approaches to decision making at all levels. This concerns executives, who are responsible for the day-to-day management of a company. As Berle and Means noted, to govern companies effectively, executives should avoid conflict of interests and managerial opportunism. This will facilitate reducing agency costs and improve corporate performance. From this perspective, executive nomination and monitoring play the most important role in reaching the above objective. Both these corporate control mechanisms are established by shareholders. Therefore, we suppose that an executive performance depends on the structure of corporate ownership and the type of controlling owner. Regrettably, since the beginning the process of privatization in 1992 no research has been conducted to answer the question: "Is there a relationship between ownership structure and efficiency of decision making by executives?"Item Board Committee Practices in Ukraine(Virtus Interpress, 2005) Костюк, Олександр Миколайович; Костюк, Александр Николаевич; Kostiuk, Oleksandr MykolaiovychInternational board practice concerning establishing committees on the board is still not spread in the Ukraine. The state obliged Ukrainian joint stock companies to establish an audit commission. But the commission is not on the supervisory board. It is not an integral part of the board. Members of the audit commission are prohibited to be members of the supervisory board at the same time. Although the audit commission reports to the supervisory board, objectives of the audit commission are narrowed only to controlling financial transactions executed by the management board. Therefore, it is worth of establishing an audit committee on the supervisory board with a broader spectrum of functions and equipped with the deepest knowledge on corporate governance mechanisms.Item Operational risk governance: the Basel approach(Українська академія банківської справи Національного банку України, 2014) Афанасьєва, Ольга Борисівна; Афанасьева, Ольга Борисовна; Afanasieva, Olha Borysivna; Рябіченко, Д.О.This paper analyses key documents of Basel Committee which concern operational risk governance and identifies the interconnectedness between risk source, type of the event leading to losses, loss type and its distribution by business lines. The comparative characteristic of the main operational risk governance stages is provided and the relationships between governance bodies are overviewed.Item The pros and cons of stock options as a part of ceo compensation(Ternopil National Economic University, 2012) Govorun, D.A.; Goncharuk, A.In post-crises period there was a tendency to reduce stock options as a part of managerial compensation, correlating with the period before financial crisis. Many discussions were organized around executives’ remuneration by specialist in corporate governance.Item Independent Directors Remuneration in Various Corporate Governance Systems: Empirical Evidence from Banks(Інжек, 2012) Костюк, Олександр Миколайович; Костюк, Александр Николаевич; Kostiuk, Oleksandr Mykolaiovych; Govorun D.A.; Sarkizova O.O.; Manzhula I.P.; Shablii A.V.Стаття презентує дослідження винагороди директорів банків в різних системах корпоративного управління. Один із основних висновків зроблено стосовно того, що банки до сих пір використовують практику «плата за присутність», проте, в окремих випадках намагаються вводити «плату за ефективність», що є порівнюваним з попередніми висновками. Також було виявлено, що практика винагороди незалежних директорів банків змінюється залежно від системи корпоративного управління, що використовується.Item Financial Distress: Corporate Governance & Finacial Reporting Issues(Scholar`s Press Publishing, 2014) Костюк, Олександр Миколайович; Костюк, Александр Николаевич; Kostiuk, Oleksandr Mykolaiovych; Афанасьєва, Ольга Борисівна; Афанасьева, Ольга Борисовна; Afanasieva, Olha Borysivna; Лапіна, Юлія Григорівна; Лапина, Юлия Григорьевна; Lapina, Yuliia HryhorivnaThe world is recovering from a period of tremendous turmoil and instability in the capital markets, it is more important now than ever that governance system, regulations and accounting standards promote right decisions, policies and transparent financial statements that support sustainability and safe economic development. Weak accounting and not accurate financial reporting led companies to wrong governance decisions that provoked an enormous catastrophe which still echoes for the global economy. One of the major problems in modern business world is that most stockholders are divorced from the running of the business so they may not have the appropriate level of knowledge to assess their management’s stewardship of their assets. This agent-principal problem can be solved by proper accounting and reporting practices and further improvement of governance standards. So ensuring the integrity of the essential reporting and monitoring systems will require boards of directors to set and enforce clear lines of responsibility and accountability throughout the organization.